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Arbitrators are the lightning rod for investment arbitration’s most contentious 
political debates. Investment arbitration was originally conceived as a means to 
depoliticize international investment law. The regime was designed to extricate 
investment disputes from national courts and gunboat diplomacy, entrusting them 
instead to a neutral law-bound process.1 According to its critics, however, investment 
arbitration is neither neutral, nor a legitimate law-bound process.2  They lay most of the 
blame with international arbitrators.   
Critics contend that, instead of law and appropriate policy considerations, investment 
arbitrators’ decisions are often the product of extra-legal factors—from their own 
ideology, to the nature of disputants, to their personal self-interest.3 For every hypothesis 
about what extra-legal factors affect investment arbitrators’ decisions, there seems to be 
an equal and opposite hypothesis.  
Critics hypothesize that investment arbitrators favor their appointing party in a self-
interested effort to increase the likelihood of future appointments;4 defenders counter 
 
1. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-state 
Arbitral Awards: The Re-politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 211(2010) (purpose of investment arbitration is to depoliticize investment disputes); Ibrahim 
Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and 
MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 102-03 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. 
Parra eds., 1st ed. 1991). 
2. These critiques are summarized in a highly publicized statement drafted by approximately fifty 
academics from various jurisdictions. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement, PUBLIC 
STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 1 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http:// 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf (expressing concern 
that investment arbitration has harmed the public welfare, particularly by “hampering . . . the 
ability of governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development 
and environmental sustainability”). One sign of the collective effect of these criticisms is that it is 
now commonplace to speak of a “backlash against” and “legitimacy crisis in” investment 
arbitration. See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel, et 
al. eds., 2010); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 
(2005); Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against 
the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491 (2009). 
3. In this article, I use the term “extra-legal” to refer to a host of factors that are apart from legal 
texts, precedents and procedures. These include “ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction 
to other institutions, the nature of litigants, or the makeup of [tribunals].” Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 877 (2008); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in 
International Law, 10 SINGAPORE YB INT’L L. 19, 30-31 nn.40-43 (2006) (referring to an 
“arbitration fraternity” that promotes its own interests at the expense of legitimate state 
interests). In addition to scholarly commentary, several advocacy groups have advanced this 
position. See, e.g., Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice: how law firms, 
arbitrators and financiers are fueling an investment arbitration boom, CORPORATE EUROPE 
OBSERVATORY (Nov. 12, 2012), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-
from-injustice.pdf. 
4. The propriety and potential effects of such “favoritism” is taken up infra notes 55-63, and 
accompanying text. 
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that arbitrators’ strongest self-interest is in developing reputations for impartiality.5 
Critics challenge arbitration rules that prohibit arbitrators from sharing nationality with 
the parties because they preclude States from appointing culturally sympathetic 
arbitrators;6 defenders call these same rules a “step in the right direction.”7  Critics 
complain that investment arbitrators are a closed “club,”8 while defenders claim such 
critiques are exaggerated. 9  Critics argue that arbitrators are inclined to render 
compromise awards so that neither party is dissatisfied; 10  defenders counter that 
balancing methodologies are “perhaps something quite different than arbitrators 
traditionally conceived.”11  
Perhaps the most damning hypothesis is that investment arbitrators systematically 
value investor interests over State interests, either to increase their own business 
opportunities12 or because of their policy preferences favor investor claims over State 
interests.13 Defenders respond, quite vehemently, that partisan decision-making would 
 
5. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009). 
6. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: 
The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2007) (identifying as a weakness in investment arbitration 
tribunals the inability under ICSID rules of States to appoint their own nationals to ensure that 
arbitrators have sufficient understanding and sympathy for the context of States’ decision 
making). 
7. Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339 (2010) 
(arguing that rules that preclude appointing of an arbitrator who shares the nationality of one 
party as “a step in the right direction”). 
8. David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for 
Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2010).  
9. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1, 77-78 (2007). 
10. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 34 (2008) (arguing that since “arbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and 
paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in rendering decisions that will 
maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in future disputes. The result is an 
incentive to render compromised judgments that do not badly offend either party.”) (cited in 
Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite 
Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 49 n.4 (2010)). 
11. Alec Stone Sweet, Arbitration and Judicialization, 1(9) OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, at 75 (Jan. 
20, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988923. 
12. Cf. Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (hypothesizing that in domestic arbitration, by ignoring applicable 
mandatory rules, arbitrators can “develop a reputation as a desirable arbitrator” and thus 
increase their chances at future selection). 
13. This concern is echoed by many scholars. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in 
Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States¸ 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 207 n.134 (2010) 
(noting that many investment arbitrators “have a background primarily in international 
commercial arbitration rather than public international law” and that background “may make 
[them] less familiar with or concerned about public international law interpretive approaches”); 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39, 41-42 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 
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be counterproductive14 if not “suicidal”15 for arbitrators. The allegations of systemic bias 
have, however, refused to be dispelled by these and related responses.  
Most of these hypotheses and counter-hypotheses are based on anecdotal accounts of 
the system or more general dissatisfaction with, or support for, the substantive policy 
outcomes of particular cases. However, each hypothesis is predicated on certain often-
unarticulated empirical assumptions. These empirical assumptions have remained 
untested and largely been taken for granted. Recently, an increasing number of scholars 
have begun testing these various empirical assumptions. 
This new research has drawn inspiration from the extensive body of existing empirical 
literature on domestic and international judges,16 and (to a lesser extent) domestic U.S. 
arbitrators.17 The ostensible purpose of both bodies of research is to evaluate objectively 
various hypotheses about the potential influence of extra-legal factors in adjudicatory 
decision-making. Despite the similarities, there are important respects in which the two 
seemingly similar sets of inquiries differ. 
Many distinctive features of investment arbitration affect the nature of empirical 
inquires. On the one hand, the study of investment arbitrators presents unique 
methodological challenges. Investment arbitration is a relatively new, rapidly expanding 
and evolving, and politically charged environment.18 Investment arbitration awards and 
related documentation are not systematically available. As a result of these features, 
data about investment arbitrators is more limited and fragmented than the most-often 
vast data sets that are relied on for research regarding either domestic judicial decision-
making or international judicial decision-making.19  
Another important distinction between research on investment arbitrators and similar 
research on judges is the potential effect of such research on the object of study. Judicial 
decision-making exists within relatively stable governmentally established institutions.  
 
2008) (arguing that the fact that because most arbitrators come from commercial arbitration 
backgrounds, they may not be as sensitive to the public nature of the interests involved); David 
Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an 
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 411-12 (2010). 
14. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2008-09). 
15. Sweet, supra note 11, at 21 (“[I]t seems suicidal for arbitrators to proceed . . . with a heavy thumb 
pressed permanently down on the investors’ side in cases with very high political stakes.”). 
16. See infra notes 24–80, and accompanying text.  
17. See infra notes 24–80, and accompanying text.  
18. Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
391, 393 (2012) (noting the explosion in the caseload and the fact that cases are require “complex 
and politically fraught value-balancing exercises”). 
19. The International Court of Justice also has a very limited set of cases to study. In total, it has only 
“heard 124 contentious cases and has considered twenty-six requests for advisory opinions in its 
sixty-five-year history, resulting in an annual filing rate of slightly more than two cases—
contentious or advisory—per year.” Born, infra note 136, at 805 (footnote omitted). Unlike 
investment arbitral awards, however, all judgments are public.  
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Empiricists approach judicial decision-making as an existing phenomenon, knowing it is 
largely structurally impervious to critiques by outside scholars. By contrast, empirical 
researchers studying the decision-making of investment arbitrators must have a degree 
of specialized knowledge in the field. Not surprisingly, therefore, scholars conducting 
empirical research in investment arbitration are rarely passive scholarly observers, but 
instead often have specific connections to particular actors within, or viewpoints about, 
the field.20 Relatedly, researchers in investment arbitration often propose specific reforms 
to the field tied to their research findings.21 The stakes for empirical research about 
investment arbitration, in other words, are high because it specifically aims at and has 
the potential to promote specific reforms. 
This paper examines the state of empirical research about investment arbitrators and 
related reform proposals. My aim is not to weigh in on specific proposed reforms, but 
instead to evaluate the potential for empirical research to contribute to development of a 
more comprehensive understanding of international adjudication. Through the lens of 
specific reform proposals that draw from empirical studies in the field, this Article 
analyzes the limitations and potential contributions of empirical research to the 
development of investment arbitration. This analysis suggests that purportedly neutral 
empirical inquiries about the potential bias of investment arbitrators may themselves at 
times be colored by particular policy preferences. The solution, I propose, is to situate and 
supplement empirical research about investment arbitration with qualitative research 
and comparative institutional analysis regarding other international tribunals. This 
approach will help control for the policy interests that can affect empirical inquiries 
about investment arbitrators. It will also help research about investment arbitration 
contribute to development of a comprehensive theory of international adjudication.  
Part I of this paper begins with a brief sketch of some of the most significant 
methodological challenges raised generally by empirical research into adjudicatory 
decisionmaking. It also addresses more specifically how some of those methodological 
challenges affect empirical research regarding investment arbitrators. The assessment of 
empirical methodology provides a backdrop to the analysis of issues in the remainder of 
the paper.  
Part II offers an evaluation of selected reforms that have been proposed for 
 
20. It might be interesting to study empirically the profiles of those engaged in empirical research 
regarding investment arbitration. I would hypothesize that such research would reveal two major 
trends among the most prominent researchers—either some direct professional experience 
working in the field (in a firm, as an arbitrator or as a clerk for arbitrator) or active involvement in 
an international NGO that works on international investment law issues. I am not suggesting 
that these backgrounds in themselves undermine the credibility of researchers or are perfectly 
predictive of their views on investment arbitration. I do suggest, however, that they might provide 
an interesting contrast with the profiles of U.S. scholars who have studied judicial decision-
making from a more detached position.  
21. Two such proposed reforms are the subject of this article. See infra Part II. 
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investment arbitration based, in part, on some findings in empirical research. In Section 
A, I examine Albert van den Berg’s study of dissenting opinions by party-appointed 
arbitrators and related proposals to dramatically reduce if not eliminate dissenting 
opinions.22 Section B examines Gus Van Harten’s study of jurisdictional rulings, and 
related proposal for a permanent International Investment Court.23 I use both studies to 
examine some of the methodological challenges identified in Part I, and to illustrate the 
risks of linking empirical research to specific reform proposals. Part II also analyzes, in 
comparison with other adjudicatory models, some questions about system design in 
investment arbitration that are raised by the two studies. 
Based on the findings in Part II, Part III argues for integration of research about 
investment arbitration into a comprehensive theory of international adjudication. Public 
international adjudication, including investment arbitration, aims at the neutral 
imposition of legal limitations on the exercise of State power. While they are sometimes 
compared, they are rarely analyzed together in empirical research. 
Part III argues for the broadening of empirical research regarding investment 
arbitrators to consider other features of system design. It nevertheless calls for caution in 
giving excessive weight to or predicating proposed reforms on limited findings. To that 
end, it argues that quantitative empirical findings should be cross-tested through 
comparative analysis with other international tribunals, and in the context of greater 
dialogue with other forms of qualitative scholarship. 
I. Empirical Research Regarding Investment Arbitrators 
Empirical research on adjudicatory decision-making by both judges and arbitrators 
has become a genre of its own, even within the larger body of empirical legal studies24 
and specifically empirical research in international legal scholarship.25 This trend is 
 
22. Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). 
23. Although Van Harten’s empirical research supports his call for an international investment court, 
it came much later than his original calls for the court. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180-84 (2007); Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International 
Investment Court, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008, Paper No. 22/08 
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424.   
24. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 
IND. L.J. 141 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal 
Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2011). Jason Yackee explores in 
his contribution to this volume a thoughtful, and related, assessment of the need for greater 
cooperation between legal scholars and social scientists in designing empirical research. See Jason 
Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater 
Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L 277 (2013).  
25. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012) (“[A] new generation of empirical studies is elaborating on how 
international law works in different contexts.”); Beth A. Simmons & Andrew B. Breidenbach, 
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evident not only from the sheer volume of published papers, but also the fact that there 
are now even entire symposia dedicated to the topic.26 This Part examines in Section A 
the goals of such research, both with respect to domestic and international judges and 
also with respect to investment arbitrators. In Section B, I survey some of the most 
significant methodological challenges in all empirical studies of adjudicatory decision-
making, and the unique ways that these challenges are manifest in the study of 
investment arbitrators.  
A. Goals and Effects of Empirical Research  
Empirical research regarding investment arbitrators derives both inspiration and 
methodological approaches from empirical research into judicial decision-making. But 
there are also important differences, both in terms of specific goals and in its impact. 
This Section examines those differences and their potential implications for empirical 
research about investment arbitrators.  
1. The Draw to Empirics 
In the context of national judicial decision-making, two schools of thought have 
inspired the growing body of empirical research. The first is the anti-formalist critique of 
legal decision-making. 27  The conventional, formalist view of adjudicatory decision-
making is that outcomes depend on an almost mechanical application of law to the facts 
of the case. This view still has significant purchase in certain circles, particularly in civil 
law systems.28 In U.S. academic and professional communities, legal realists, and later 
critical legal scholars, have challenged this view of judicial decision-making. They posit 
that other factors, most notably personal policy preferences of judges, determine 
outcomes.29 Scholars have pursued empirical research to prove that the realists had the 
better view and that formalism was an obsolete model for understanding legal decision-
making.30  
 
The Empirical Turn in International Economic Research, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 198, 200 (2011) 
(“In the specific area of international economic law, the trend is less noted, but is on the 
rise.”). 
26. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: An 
Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005). 
27. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decision-making, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1924 (2009). 
28. Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? (2012), http://www.wipol.uni-
bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12, at 32 (cited 
with permission). 
29. This approach is sometimes characterized as an “attitudinal model” of judicial decision-making. 
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
65 (1993). 
30. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1913 (arguing that “[r]ecent empirical studies . . . [rely on 
a] premise . . . that either law determines case outcomes, or judicial decision-making is 
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A second beacon for empiricists, which follows from the first, is concerns about 
systemic bias. If factors other than neutral application of law to facts affect case 
outcomes, systems of justice that are presumed to be law-bound and impartial could, 
instead, be systematically biased in favor of certain parties or outcomes.31 The effort to 
identify the factors that contribute to systemic bias, and to measure the extent to which 
that supposed bias affects outcomes, has lured even more empiricists to the field.32  
Together these two postulates have generated an extensive body of research. The 
ostensibly neutral yardstick of empirics seems like a perfect tool to evaluate the supposed 
bias of adjudicatory decision-makers.  
2. Empirical Research in Investment Arbitration 
While empirical scholars have long focused on judges, they only recently trained their 
focus on investment arbitrators. One important reason is that investment arbitration 
itself is relatively new, and, consequently, a significant body of publicly available data 
has only recently become available.33 Some of the same questions that inspire research 
into judicial decision-making have also inspired empirical research into investment 
arbitrators’ decision-making.  There are, however, some important differences. 
In the judicial context, research agendas are generally framed by theoretical 
orientations, such as anti-formalism or social-choice theory.34 Similar research regarding 
investment arbitrators, by contrast, is often inspired by, and necessarily feeds into, a 
much more particularized and driven debate about the legitimacy of investment 
arbitration.35 Empirical research about judicial decision-making may affect academic 
discussion, but so far no significant procedural or constitutional reforms have been 
proposed based on that research. By contrast, empirical research about investment 
 
impermissibly dominated by ideology and politics”).  
31. One of the most prominent works in this vein is CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).  
32. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 190. 
33. Information about international commercial arbitration is generally much less available. In 
response to critics and political pressure, investment arbitration has made significant steps to 
become more transparent. As a result, the body of publicly available information about investment 
arbitration has grown exponentially in recent years. See Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301 (2006). 
34. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1915-16. 
35. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (2007). A similar divide exists in domestic U.S. arbitration, where advocates 
for consumer and employee rights in particular regard what has been dubbed “mandatory 
arbitration” as depriving those claimants of important procedural rights they would have in U.S. 
courts. This divide has produced a vibrant political debate, and some substantial proposals for 
structural reform. Empirical research is now playing an increasingly important role in sorting out 
the nature and true extent of perceived problems with existing practices. See Peter B. Rutledge, 
Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
579 (2009).  
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arbitration has a much broader audience that extends well beyond the academic 
community.36 Research often expressly aims at particular factions within this larger 
audience, not all of whom are sophisticated consumers of empirical findings, seeking to 
bolster (or stave off) particular proposals for reform.  
What is currently referred to as a “legitimacy crisis” in investment arbitration is 
driven in part by anecdotal impressions, which are sometimes sensationalized and 
sometimes naively optimistic. Empirical data could, at least theoretically, provide a 
firmer basis for systematically evaluating the functioning of investment arbitration.37 
But the highly politicized nature of the field also creates some risks for how empirical 
research may be used, or misused.38 While “empirical studies [can] provide facts on which 
to base legal doctrine and public policy,”39 there is also “a danger that policy makers will 
take up a study for purposes that the research does not support.”40  
The allure of the ostensible neutrality of empirical research should not overtake 
critical assessments of its value in light of the limitations of both particular empirical 
studies and empirical research as a methodology for measuring phenomenon as complex 
as legal decision-making. As valuable and important as empirical research can be, it 
must be read, interpreted, and relied on only with a full understanding of its limitations. 
B. Methodological Challenges 
Critiques of empirical research into judicial behavior are by now almost as extensive 
as the original empirical research itself. Systematic reflection has led to some sober 
assessment about the methodological limitations of such research, as well as the limited 
implications of its outcomes. At a more structural level, scholars generally acknowledge 
that definitively proving or disproving systemic bias in adjudication is, quite simply, 
impossible. 41  That impossibility is inherent in empirical methodology, and in the 
peculiarities of legal decision-making.  
This Part briefly reviews some of the most significant limitations with regard to 
 
36. Empirical critiques of investment arbitration appear to have informed, for example, UNCTAD’s 
recent publication, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, available 
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf. 
37. Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 214 (“First and foremost, empirical studies give 
researchers the ability to systematically evaluate legal institutions in light of their goals.”). 
38. Gus Van Harten, Fairness and Independence in Investment Arbitration: A Critique of Susan 
Franck’s “Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, SOCIAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH NETWORK 1-2 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1740031 (challenging empirical 
findings in another study as “inappropriate” in its conclusions that investment arbitration “as a 
whole, functions fairly” and is not in need of eradication or radical overhaul”).  
39. Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 216. 
40. Van Harten, supra note 38, at 9 (objecting to the use of empirical research in support of policy 
positions regarding the U.S. Model BIT). 
41. Van Harten’s calls for reform are premised on risk and perception of bias as he acknowledges the 
impossibility of proving actual bias. See, e.g., Van Harten, supra note 38, at 5.     
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empirical study of judicial and arbitrator decision-making. A systematic survey of 
empirical methodology is beyond the scope of this article, but this brief perusal of some of 
the most significant limitations is helpful as a primer for understanding the growing 
body of empirical research in the area of investment arbitration and its relationship to 
proposed reforms. The point of this analysis is not to discourage empirical research, or to 
discount the contributions it can make to our understanding of this emerging field. It is 
instead an effort to rein in potentially exaggerated importance that may be attributed to 
specific findings, which at best only provide partial and provisional insights into the 
phenomena they study.  
1. The Elusive Control of the Most Essential Variable 
One of the most fundamental difficulties with empirical research regarding legal 
decision-making is that it seeks (often only implicitly) to measure whether and to what 
extent extra-legal factors have affected the outcome of adjudicatory decisions. It cannot, 
however, isolate what legal outcome would otherwise have resulted in the absence of any 
hypothesized influences. In other words, it is impossible to control for the most essential 
variable (implicitly or explicitly) being tested—the “correct” legal outcome in a particular 
case.  
Absent control for the correct outcome, or at least the relative strength of a particular 
party’s case, the extent and even existence of deviations from it cannot be known for 
certain. Some methodological workarounds have been developed in an attempt to control 
for the strength of a case and the proper outcome.42 These workarounds provide proxies 
for the correct substantive outcome, which have in turn helped sharpen empirical 
inquiries.  
One example of a workaround is in Gus Van Harten’s recent work, which uses a 
content-based analysis to compare outcomes regarding jurisdiction as either more 
“restrictive” or “expansive.”43 To avoid comparison with the “correct outcome” he engages 
in a relative comparative analysis based on content analysis as between outcomes. He 
finds that arbitrators tend more often to adopt expansive interpretations on issues of 
jurisdiction, and reasons that such expansive findings tend to favor claimants because 
they “expand[] the authority of investment treaty tribunals and . . . allow[]more claims to 
proceed.” 44 Although Van Harten demonstrates a statistically significant propensity of 
 
42. Notably, Waibel and Wu signal that their future research will seek to control for the relative 
strength of jurisdictional challenges by having those challenges assessed by a panel of reputable 
investment arbitration specialists. See Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 32.  See also Van Harten, 
supra note 38, at 214.  
43. Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 226 (2012). 
44. Gus Van Harten, Pro-Investor or Pro-State Bias in Investment-Treaty Arbitration? 
Forthcoming Study Gives Cause for Concern, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEVEL., (Apr. 13, 2012), 
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investment arbitrators to adopt expansive interpretations, all we know is that these 
decisions are “more expansive” than other alternatives.  
These outcomes appear to be more expansive than those preferred by individuals 
whose policy preferences are for narrower investment arbitration jurisdiction. They do 
not, however, represent a finding that investment arbitrators’ “expansive” jurisdictional 
findings are somehow an improper deviation from the “correct” legal outcome. In fact, 
Van Harten is careful not to characterize these findings as deviating from a correct legal 
outcome,45 but he does offer a hypothesis about a possible motivation for the expansive 
jurisdictional findings—that “a strong tendency toward expansive resolutions [on 
jurisdictional issues] enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for 
claimants[.]”46 Despite the “strong tendency” in his data and how well it fits with existing 
narratives about arbitrator bias, Van Harten acknowledges that other hypotheses might 
explain the result. At least one possible alternative hypothesis is explored in greater 
detail below.47 
2. Correlation and Causation 
In addition to an inability to control for correct outcomes, another important challenge 
for empirical research regarding adjudicatory decision-making is that researchers are 
hypothesizing about causal relationships, but empirical data can only prove correlation. 
Specifically, researchers design studies to test for the influence of particular extra-legal 
factors on legal decision-making and hypothesize which variables might be responsible 
for that influence. In analyzing the data, researchers often find a correlation between the 
variables that they have designed to test for.  The problem is that observed correlations 
do not prove causation. Some examples will help illustrate.  
In one well-publicized study outside the field of adjudication, researchers found a 
strong correlation between childhood myopia and infants who slept with the light on.48 
The correlation was—reasonably, but wrongly—reported as proof that sleeping with the 
light on as an infant caused myopia. A later study found no correlation between lighting 
and myopia, but instead found a strong correlation between parental myopia and the 
development of child myopia.49 Researchers in the second study made a related inference 
 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/pro-investor-or-pro-state-bias-in-investment-treaty-
arbitration-forthcoming-study-gives-cause-for-concern/#_ftn10 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
45. For example, he states, “If states expected the relevant issues to be resolved restrictively, this has 
clearly not been the case in practice.” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 239. Of course, 
interpretations that differ from what States expected are not the same thing as an improper 
interpretation of “ambiguous language in investment treaties.” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 249. 
46. Van Harten, supra note 44, at 214. 
47. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text. 
48. Graham E. Quinn et al., Myopia and Ambient Lighting at Night, NATURE, May 15, 1999, at 113. 
49. Holly Wagner, Night Lights Don't Lead To Nearsightedness, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY 
RESEARCH NEWS, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/nitelite.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 2000). 
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(to provide an alternative hypothesis for the correlation identified in the earlier study) 
that myopic parents were more likely to leave a light on in their children’s bedroom.50 
Myopia, it seems, also interfered with the first researchers’ ability to distinguish 
correlation from causation.51 
Closer to the topic at hand, in the U.S. domestic arbitration context, some striking 
correlations have led commentators to hypothesize about the existence of causal 
relationships. For example, some scholars have observed that business claimants have 
exceptionally high win rates (in excess of over ninety percent!) in consumer debt 
arbitrations.52 Based on the observed correlation in this data, scholars, policymakers, and 
commentators concluded that consumer debt arbitration was biased or “heavily slanted” 
in favor of business parties.53 As it turns out, however, creditors had “even higher win 
rates (raging form 98.4 percent to 100 percent)” in debt collection cases in national 
courts.54 Bias in the arbitration process, in other words, does not appear to have been the 
cause of high win rates for companies, or at least the strong correlation does not in itself 
prove that it was.  
Another criticism of consumer debt collection arbitration, which echoes some 
complaints about investment arbitration, is that repeat-players enjoy beneficial 
treatment by arbitrators who are anxious to be reappointed and therefore seek to render 
 
50. See id. 
51. See id.  Another amusingly optimistic assumption of causation based on a finding of mere 
correlation is the assertion that frequent sex makes men and women look at least seven years 
younger. Claire Carter, Sex Is the Secret to Looking Younger, Claims Researcher, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 5, 2013, 7:30 AM), www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/10161279/Sex-is-the-secret-
to-looking-younger-claims-researcher.html. It is at least possible that men and women who 
look younger are better able and more inclined to attract more sexual partners than those who 
look much older than them. It is equally plausible, however, that people who are interested in 
having frequent sex are more attentive to their appearance and hence cultivating a younger 
look. 
52. See also Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd and 
Shelby and Congressmen Frank and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with Hofstra University School 
of Law) (“Studies have found the arbitrators find for companies against consumers 94 to 96% 
of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive to find for 
those who select them: the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.”) (citing 
John O’Donnell et al., The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN (Sept. 2007), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545; Simone 
Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 
(July 16, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0716/p13s01-wmgn.html). 
53. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 
HASINTGS BUS. L.J. 77, 79 (2010) (citing Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry 
Using It to Quash Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 148 (2009) (testimony of David 
Arkush stating that in success rates and award amounts, AAA arbitrations appear to be heavily 
slanted in favor of businesses)). 
54. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, __ Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION __ (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101371. 
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outcomes favorable to those most likely to reappoint them. This hypothesis seems 
compelling both because of its inherent logic55 and because of its support from anecdotal 
evidence.56 It also seems consistent with observed statistics indicating an exceptionally 
high correlation between corporate parties and favorable outcomes cited above.  
Here, empirical research did find a modest statistical correlation between repeat-
players and win rates (though no correlation with respect to percentage of recovery).57 
This correlation was consistent with the hypothesis of arbitrator bias. Researchers also 
found, however, that repeat businesses are more likely to settle or otherwise dispose of 
unmeritorious cases before an award than non-repeat businesses.58 The screening out of 
cases would increase win rates and, the study concluded, was more likely to have 
produced a repeat-player effect than improper bias among arbitrators.59  
The lesson of these studies is that while correlation can provide support for a 
researcher’s hypothesis about causation, 60  it does not prove it. For any reasonably 
complex phenomenon, such as adjudicatory decision-making, a range of possible 
hypotheses can explain observed correlations in data.61 This insight is a cornerstone of 
scientific methodology. Nevertheless, in discussing their findings, many studies, 
including studies in investment arbitration, elide discussion of their hypotheses about 
causation and the empirical correlations observed.62 In addition, even careful studies that 
 
55. Numerous commentators have written presuming that, as rational actors, arbitrators necessarily 
decide cases with an eye to earning future appointments. Although this presumed influence of 
self-interest is often stated as a matter of fact, it is, in reality, only a hypothesis.  
56. See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the 
Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2009) (critiquing the 2007 Public Citizen report 
entitled, “The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers” as relying on 
anecdotal evidence instead of statistical data). 
57. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 
25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 843, 913 (2010). 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007) (“[T]he reader [of 
empirical studies] should not place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, 
because such a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not prove the 
substantive significance of that correlation.”). 
61. See Sisk, supra note 3, at 887 (“Statistical analysis simply cannot capture the full dimension 
of that unique and important human enterprise known as judging.”). 
62. For example, even if generally careful, Van Harten implies that a higher than expected rate of 
rulings in favor of investors suggests systemic bias: “If the system is meant to provide an 
impartial and independent adjudicative process based on principles of rationality, fairness, 
and neutrality, then the interpretation and application of the law should reflect a degree of 
evenness between claimants and respondent states in the resolution of contentious legal 
issues arising from ambiguous treaty texts[.]” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 216. Waibel and 
Wu, meanwhile, include in their stated hypothesis not only the testable aspects of their 
theories, but a causal explanation, hypothesizing that “Arbitrators from developing countries 
are less likely to hold the host country liable because they are more familiar with the economic 
and social conditions in developing countries and host countries the more likely source of future 
arbitral appointments.” Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 23 (emphasis added). Several other 
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limit discussion of the actual empirical findings themselves often play down or ignore 
methodological limitations in stating more general conclusions that may be drawn from 
the studies.63 
3. Ideology and Policy Preferences 
Another common problem with empirical research into adjudicatory decision-making 
is that it seeks to test the effect of decision-makers’ political ideologies or policy 
preferences. Such ideologies and preferences are nearly impossible to measure directly. 
Instead, researchers use indirect sources and proxies for decision-makers’ actual policy 
preferences. In research regarding the U.S. judiciary, for example, common sources for 
ascribing ideology are the political party of the appointing president,64 social background 
and experience, newspaper evaluations of judges, and prior judicial decisions.65 More 
recently, scholars have questioned whether reliance on ideology (even assuming that 
proxy measures were accurate gauges of ideology) adequately “distinguish[es] between 
values as a self-conscious motive for decision-making and values as a subconscious 
influence on cognition.”66 This is an important distinction when assessing adjudicatory 
decision-making because self-conscious imposition of policy preferences teeters close to 
bias or professional misconduct, whereas subconscious influence is simply part of what it 
means to be human.  
This methodological hurdle has particularly important implications for research in 
investment arbitration. Critiques of investment arbitration often speak in terms of an 
over-simplified dichotomy between a “pro-investor” and a “pro-state” orientation.67 In 
 
possible hypotheses could explain an observed correlation. See also Waibel & Wu, supra note 
28, at 20 (stating that they are inquiring into whether “the fact that many arbitrators wear 
another hat as advocates in concurrent ICSID cases for the investor or the host state colors 
their decision making” not simply whether there is a correlation between identified factors).  
See also Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 39 (“Our empirical analysis shows that arbitrators 
appear to be influenced, in some cases, by their policy views and do not simply apply the law 
as it stands when deciding investment cases.”) (emphasis added). 
63. See Van Harten, supra note 38, at 9 (arguing for greater caution on the part of the researcher in 
the statement of conclusions). 
64. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2006). 
65. Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the 
“Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 366 (2005).  
66. Dan M. Kahan, ‘Ideology in’ vs. ‘Cultural Cognition of’ Law: What Difference Does it Make?, 
Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865, at 1. 
67. See Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 21 (using “pro-investor” to refer to a “worldview” that 
“attach[es] overriding importance to the protection of investment (“property rights”), over and 
above other societal goals”). Despite using this terminology, Waibel and Wu acknowledge that 
“even if an arbitrator is seen as being pro-investor or pro-state, these predispositions do not 
necessarily correspond to a coherent political philosophy.” Id. at 36. Relatedly, they acknowledge 
that policy preferences are not “directly observable,” see id. at 22, and hence they use as a proxy 
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contrast to the liberal/conservative dichotomy to describe ideologies that have been used 
in judicial contexts, this characterization aligns not simply with ideological preferences. 
Instead, it links presumed ideological preferences with particular parties (investors or 
States). While self-consciously allowing political ideology to influence legal decision-
making may raise questions close to (and sometimes even over) the line of professional 
propriety, expressly preferring one party over another reaches far over on the wrong side 
of that line. For these reasons, characterizations of ideology in empirical studies of 
investment arbitrators raise not only the same methodological problems that arise in 
studies of judicial decision-making, but also seem to improperly impugn the professional 
conduct of arbitrators in the absence of actual proof of bias.  
4. Over-Simplification of Outcomes 
Empirical analysis of inputs and outcomes of an adjudicatory process must be 
translated into mathematical terms. There are several ways to translate outcomes into 
dependent variables, though the most common types are binary win-loss outcomes.68 This 
approach has been criticized in the context of appellate cases because there are more 
than two possible dispositions, including affirmed in part and remanded, affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, etc.69 The complexity of outcomes to legal disputes can lead to 
coding errors when reducing dispositions to binary outcomes.  
A related, and “perhaps the most troubling,” critique regarding research in the U.S. 
court system is that researchers investigate only the outcomes of decisions, not their 
content. Thus, a disposition on procedural grounds is treated the same as a decision on 
the merits.70 In addition, this approach is unable to take account of differences between 
“[o]pinions that reach broad conclusions of law and include significant dicta” versus 
“opinions that decide cases narrowly on only the arguments presented” and opinions that 
“hew closely to precedent” or decide cases “on first principles.”71 Scholars have been 
developing methodologies for engaging in systematic content-based analysis of legal 
decisions. To date, however, even newer theories cannot fully account for the role of legal 
reasoning and the role of precedent and doctrine.72  
In a field as new as investment arbitration, the legal texts are inherently ambiguous, 
and even legal methodologies are very much debated. In this setting in particular, it may 
well be that the content of decisions, rather than the outcomes, have more to tell us about 
 
repeat appointments by one category of parties or another.  
68. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1924. 
69. Id. at 1924.  
70. Id. at 1926-27. 
71. Id. 
72. Sisk, supra note 3, at 884 (“A fully specified legal model will prove eternally elusive because legal 
reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable parameters for debate on the determinate 
nature of text and doctrine cannot be described by number.”). 
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how the field is evolving.  
G. Conclusion 
Empirical studies of investment arbitration face all the same challenges as research 
into national judicial decision-making, as well as some additional challenges related to 
the nature of the field.73 Investment arbitration is still in its “adolescence.”74 It operates 
in a volatile and politically charged environment. At least some empirical research is 
formulated with the articulated aim of proving some of the field’s most controversial 
contentions, specifically that investment arbitrators are biased or are free from bias.75 
The problem is that, while these contentions cannot be proven, an audience eager for 
data may be too willing to (mis)interpret the research as definitive proof of the policies 
they seek to promote.76 
The inability to prove systemic bias in investment arbitration extends beyond the 
general methodological challenges described above. It is inherent in the nature of 
empirical research itself. Empirical research tests a hypothesis about the relationship 
between two or more variables. It can find tentative support for a hypothesis and 
disprove alternative hypotheses, thereby indirectly supporting the likelihood of the 
working hypothesis. It can never prove a hypothesis. In Karl Popper’s famous 
explanation, the hypothesis that “all swans are white” cannot be proven true by any 
number of observations of white swans, but the sighting of just one black swan may 
disprove it.77 This important limitation is often lost on casual consumers of empirical 
research or overlooked by over-enthusiastic onlookers.  
As noted above,78 members of the wider investment arbitration community and its 
skeptics are avid, but not always sophisticated, consumers of empirical data that might 
support their policy interests. While a welcome contribution to the important debates of 
the day, empirical findings should be evaluated against the backdrop of a clear 
understanding of methodological limitations and without an expectation that any 
empirical data, no matter how titillating, can definitively resolve the critical questions 
 
73. Yackee, supra note 18, at 403 (“[E]mpirically studying epistemic communities [like the 
international investment law community] poses certain difficulties.”). 
74. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49 (2013). 
75. Compare Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, with SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, and Eric Posner & 
Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005). 
76. Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
435, 488 (2009) (“While the general initial results are encouraging, one should contextualize them 
properly, given their limitations. The presence of the two statistically significant simple effects 
also suggests that there are areas ripe for targeted reform.”). 
77. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008).  
78. See supra Section I.A. 
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facing the investment arbitration regime. As a leading commentator has noted in the 
judicial context, “[e]mpirical study has yet to demonstrate that any extralegal factor—
ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of 
litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains more than a very small part of the 
variation in outcomes (when exploring large numbers of judicial decisions in diverse 
subject-matter areas).”79  
The next Part examines two empirical studies that have generated some significant 
debate in investment arbitration, in part because they have been over-read (at least by 
some) as suggesting, if not proving, the existence of bias among investment arbitrators.80 
Part III then draws on the observations in the first two Parts to suggest future directions 
for research in investment arbitration.  
II. Empirical Research Tied to Reform Proposals  
Reform proposals for investment arbitration have been proliferating.81 Some emanate 
from the most esteemed ranks of investment arbitrators and others from its most ardent 
critics. This Part assesses two such proposed reforms. Section A begins with proposals to 
eliminate, or at least greatly restrict, dissenting opinions. Section B takes up the most 
radical reform proposal of all—elimination of investment arbitration altogether in favor 
of an International Investment Court.  
 
79. Sisk, supra note 3, at 877. 
80. Other studies have been over-read as definitively disproving the existence of bias in investment 
arbitration. For example, Susan Franck’s work is often characterized as disproving bias in 
investment arbitration, even though she states clearly that “further research is necessary” and 
that her research provides a basis for “cautious[] optimis[m]” rather than definitive proof. See 
Franck, supra note 76; Kapeliuk, supra note 10, at 48 (finding that repeat arbitrators “display no 
biases and no tendencies to ‘split the difference”’); see also Gus Van Harten, Reply, 2010-2011 Y.B. 
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y. (replying to Susan Franck, Calvin Garbin & Jenna Perkins, Response: 
Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing International 
Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 883 (Karl. P. Sauvant ed., 2010-11). 
81. Apart from proposals to eliminate entirely investment arbitration, most proposed reforms aim at 
procedures in investment arbitration that indirectly rein in investment arbitrators or increase 
their accountability. The most popular proposed reform is to develop an appellate body to increase 
consistency in awards. See Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. 
& FOREIGN AFF. 179 (2005); Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: The OECD Governments' Perspective, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 14 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds., 2008). The other 
important set of reform proposals aim at increasing transparency and third-party participation, a 
reform recently realized in an important set of UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-
UNCITRAL-Rules-on-Transparency.pdf. For a more general assessment of recent reforms, see 
Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and 
Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 885 
(2007). 
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A. Dissents by Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
In a highly-publicized study, leading international arbitrator and scholar Albert van 
den Berg presented the “astonishing fact” that nearly all dissents written by party-
appointed arbitrators are written in favor of the party who appointed them.82 This is a 
number that captures attention and, perhaps predictably, has been cited as a source of 
support for proposed reforms by Jan Paulsson, another leading arbitrator and scholar, 
that party-appointed arbitrators be abolished altogether.83 In assessing the importance of 
van den Berg’s findings and their potential implications for reform proposals, it is 
essential first to locate them in a larger framework.84  
1. Overall Frequency of Dissents 
As a starting point, it is helpful to first look at how frequently dissents are being 
issued by party-appointed arbitrators. Van den Berg identifies 34 dissenting opinions by 
party-appointed arbitrators out of a total of 150 decisions studied.85 Although we can 
easily calculate that those numbers translate into an approximately 22% rate of 
occurrence of such dissents, that calculation does not tell us much. What we need to 
know is: Is 22% a “big” number?86 To answer that question, we need to ask further: “big” 
compared to what?87  
Van den Berg appears to suggest that the appropriate baseline for comparison should 
 
82. Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (2010). 
83. See Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 339 
(2010).  
84. I do not in this paper undertake either to update van den Berg’s research, which examined awards 
only through December 31, 2008, or to independently reassess his classification of particular 
separate opinions as dissenting (as opposed to concurring). 
85. In addition, although van den Berg limits his analysis to dissents authored by party-appointed 
arbitrators, his discussion sometimes may give the reader the misimpression that only party-
appointed arbitrators draft dissenting opinions. In fact, van den Berg acknowledges that a small, 
but statistically significant number of dissents are authored by arbitrators who are not appointed 
by a party. Although van den Berg does not undertake to identify the total number of dissents, he 
incidentally references to at least seven dissenting opinions authored by arbitrators who were not 
appointed by a party. Given the small sample size, and the attempt to discern arbitrator 
incentives for authoring dissents, it is difficult to see how these other dissents can be considered 
statistically insignificant, at least in understanding overall rates of dissent in investment 
arbitration. Even if the seven additional dissents not by party-appointed arbitrators are a full 
accounting of that category of dissents, that would change the overall rate of dissents to 27% and 
mean that in van den Berg’s sample the rate of overall dissents that are written in favor of 
appointing parties is significantly lower than the near 100% that van den Berg cites. 
86. See Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy¸ supra note 54, at 4 (quoting MICHAEL BLASTLAND & 
ANDREW DILNOT, THE NUMBERS GAME: THE COMMONSENSE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING NUMBERS 
IN THE NEWS, IN POLITICS, AND IN LIFE (2009)).  
87. Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy¸ supra note 54, at 5. 
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be nearly zero. He argues against various justifications for dissenting opinions, and 
concludes that they are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, such as if 
“[s]omething went fundamentally wrong in the arbitral process” or the “arbitrator has 
been threatened” with physical danger.88 This perspective about dissenting opinions may 
well be tied to van den Berg’s own legal background in the civil law tradition, which 
historically disfavors (or prohibits) dissenting opinions.89 If the appropriate baseline for 
the number of dissents were near zero, the 22% level could be considered high.90   
A zero or near-zero baseline would be appropriate in some domestic contexts, 
particularly those civil law systems that prohibit dissenting opinions or do not have an 
existing practice of them. A zero baseline, however, does not seem appropriate in 
investment arbitration because the ICSID Convention expressly authorizes dissenting 
opinions.91 Moreover, the existing practice in investment arbitration is consistent with 
prevailing practices among a range of other international tribunals that incorporate both 
civil law and common law participants and procedures.92  
 
88. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 831. 
89. Van den Berg himself makes this point, quoting French Scholar and delegate to the 1899 Hague 
Peace Conference Chevilier Descamps, who reasoned that dissenting opinions improperly create 
“the appearance of there being two judgments.” Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 828. 
90. A compelling argument could be made, and has been made by van den Berg in correspondence 
on this issue, that a 22% dissent rate is a “big” number in comparison with rates of dissent in 
international commercial arbitration. Email from Albert van den Berg to author, Oct. 4, 2013 
(on file with author). According to one study, in ICC cases, there are dissents in less than 9% 
of cases and in LCIA cases in less than 3% of cases. Peter J. Rees and Patrick Rohn, 
Dissenting Opinions: Can they Fulfil a Beneficial Role?, 25(3) ARB. INT’L 329 (2009). While 
these numbers are considerably lower than investment arbitration, at least according to some 
commentators, lower rates of dissent in international commercial arbitration are appropriate 
if not expected.  See C Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Dissent - But Only If You Really Feel 
You Must: Why Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration Should Only 
Appear in Exceptional Circumstances, 7 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 31, 39-40 (2013). While 
international commercial arbitration is an interesting point of reference, public international 
tribunals may be a more appropriate baseline because most critiques of investment 
arbitration are based on its lack of resemblance to public international tribunals, not its 
commonalities with international commercial arbitration. 
91. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Regulations and Rules art. 48(4) (Mar. 18, 1965), available at  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (reprinted Apr. 
2006) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
92. See Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why 
the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is 
Wrongheaded, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (2012), 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/Charles_Brower_The_Death_of_the_
Two-Headed_Nightingale_Speech_2.pdf  (identifying a range of international tribunals that 
expressly permit dissenting opinions, including the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, the 
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights).  
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Data is not available on the spectrum of dissent rates among international tribunals,93 
but the one available example is helpful. According to one study, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) included at least one dissenting opinion in 900 out of 6,749 
judgments.94 While this yields just over a 13% rate of dissents, the study found that in 
cases that were not routine, cases that made “a significant contribution to the 
development, clarification or modification of its caselaw,” the rate of dissenting opinions 
was approximately 42%.95 Investment arbitration is still encountering a range of complex 
and novel issues, which may suggest that this 42% is a helpful baseline for 
understanding what might constitute a reasonable rate of dissenting opinions.  
Judge Charles Brower and Charles Rosenberg, in an extensive review and critique of 
van den Berg’s findings, have argued that rates of dissent among Supreme Courts in 
several other countries are an appropriate baseline. Dissents in these courts range from a 
relatively unusual low of 25% through a high of 62% for the U.S. Supreme Court.96 
Against this baseline, the 22% rate of dissents among party-appointed arbitrators in 
investment arbitration seems quite appropriate if not even strikingly low. Statistics from 
national Supreme Courts are interesting touchstones, but may not be appropriate as a 
baseline for comparison since each of these courts is composed of more than three 
members, making unanimity more difficult and the potential for dissents more likely 
than with three-person tribunals.97  
If aiming for comparison with three-person tribunals, another potential baseline 
might be decisions by the three-judge panels on U.S. appellate courts. There, the 
percentage of dissenting opinions is only 10% for published decisions. 98  Although 
considerably lower than the 22% in van den Berg’s study, this difference might be 
expected given that appellate decisions involve a narrower range of issues and are made 
within a framework of bounded discretion and assumed facts. Moreover, national legal 
systems have well-developed bodies of precedent that guide judicial decision-making.99 
 
93. Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, The Doctrinal Paradox and International Law, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 67, 99 (2012) (“[T]here have not yet been any articles or studies that have comprehensively 
examined dissent rates in international courts.”). 
94. Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European 
Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669, 684 (2007) (citing statistics from 1960 through June 
30, 2006). 
95. See id. (noting that many unanimous decisions by the ECHR are very routine, such as the 1,377 
judgments considering Italian violations of protections against excessive delays in court 
proceedings).  
96. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 643 (citing rate of 62% dissents for the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 25% and 37% for the previous year for the Canadian Supreme Court, and 36% for the 
Australian High Court).  
97. Unlike investment arbitral tribunals, supreme courts are also appellate courts, not courts of first 
instance. This point is discussed in more detail in the pages that follow. 
98. Edwards & Livermore, supra, note 27, at 1943. 
99. Id. at 1944. Some empirical research aims directly at investigating the extent to which precedent 
operates as a constraining force on judicial decision-making.  
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While interpreting and applying those sources may produce some disagreement, 
investment arbitration frequently involves novel legal questions, ambiguous treaty 
language, facts interpreted through cross-cultural and multi-national filters, and (if 
assumptions are correct) a deep ideological divide among parties and arbitrators. 
Previous awards are often cited, and arguably represent a form of soft precedent. But 
unlike in a system with formal stare decisis, the existence of a previous award directly on 
point does not necessarily provide an answer on the same issue for a subsequent panel. 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, a 22% dissent rate arguably might 
suggest that party-appointed arbitrators are exercising a commendable degree of 
restraint in the frequency with which they issue dissents. At a minimum, even in 
absolute terms, the level of unanimous awards (in at least 78% of cases, party-appointed 
arbitrators do not dissent in favor of the party who appointed them) means that a 
unanimous tribunal decides the vast majority of cases. This 78% unanimity rate would, 
at the very least, undermine van den Berg’s hypotheses about the emergence of 
“mandatory” dissents”100 (in which case we might expect dissents in all or almost all 
cases) or more general concerns that “politics and partisan ideological gamesmanship 
rule[] the day” for party-appointed arbitrators.101 
2. Coding Opinions as Dissents 
Brower and Rosenberg also suggest that the actual percentage of party-appointed 
arbitrator dissents favoring an appointing party is lower than 22%. According to Brower 
and Rosenberg, at least five opinions that van den Berg classifies as dissents in favor of 
an appointing party should instead be classified either as concurrences or as not 
“favoring” the appointing party. The classification of dissents is typical of the potential 
for selection bias in the coding process. Van den Berg’s general skepticism about dissents 
may have contributed to his interpretation of any disagreement with a majority that 
ruled against a party-appointed arbitrator’s appointing party as “favoring” that party, 
even if the apparent favor was of little or no value.   
Brower and Rosenberg undertake a more substantive and qualitative approach to 
classifying the dissents. Those dissents that mostly agree with the majority (for example 
dissenting on only minor points) or that seek to clarify how the award should be 
understood for future cases, are not counted as dissents favoring the appointing party, 
even if the position asserted is one that might be, in itself, more aligned with the 
appointing party’s position.  
Given the small sample size (only 34 dissents overall), this disagreement over coding 
 
100. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 830. 
101. Cf. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1944 (discussing high level of consensus in published 
U.S. appellate court decisions).  
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methodology has potentially significant ramifications for van den Berg’s final conclusion. 
Reassignment of five out of 34 cases along the lines suggested by Brower and Rosenberg 
would have a statistically significant effect on the overall number of dissents authored by 
party-appointed arbitrators. Even assuming there were no more than five cases that need 
to be reassigned,102 instead of nearly 100% of dissents being “in favor” of the appointing 
party, as van den Berg concluded, the rate would be closer to 85%. This is still a high 
rate, but not as staggering as the near-100% reported by van den Berg.  
Even if the rate is closer to 85%, that rate would still indicate that, when they do 
dissent, party-appointed arbitrators usually (according to Brower and Rosenberg) or 
almost always (according to van den Berg) dissent in favor of the party who appointed 
them. They dissent, according to van den Berg, at a much higher rate in favor of their 
appointing party than can be explained by chance,103 though arguably the sample size is 
too small for this conclusion to be statistically valid.  
Even assuming that chance cannot explain the correlation, however, such a 
correlation does not in itself suggest misconduct by individual party-appointed 
arbitrators or systemic disregard of party-appointed arbitrators’ professional obligations, 
including the duty of impartiality.104 The high correlation could be a result of the fact 
that party-appointed arbitrators are, consistent with applicable rules, intentionally 
selected by parties. In selecting arbitrators, parties generally consider arbitrators’ 
background, experience, existing decisional history, and legal and cultural background. 
They seek, subject to standards for challenge based on bias, to ensure that the arbitrator 
they appoint will represent on the tribunal their perspectives on the case.   
Against this practice for selecting party-appointed arbitrators, it would be surprising 
if we observed many (any?) dissenting opinions authored by party-appointed arbitrators 
in favor of the opposing party. Certainly, we would not expect them to issue dissenting 
opinions for their appointing party at the same level as chance, as van den Berg suggests, 
because they are not randomly selected. They represent one party’s preference for a 
decision-maker and are selected based on a careful assessment.105 If party-appointed 
arbitrators were, with any degree of regularity, writing dissenting opinions in favor of an 
opposing party, it would mean that parties were doing an exceptionally poor job of 
identifying party-appointed arbitrators.106  
 
102. I do not explore here the potential implications of such reclassifications because the data relating 
to possible reclassification is neither systematic nor complete. 
103. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 824. 
104. If party appointed arbitrators were “now expected to dissent if the party that appointed him or her 
has lost the case entirely or in part,” we would expect that the rate of party-appointed arbitrators 
dissenting to be much higher than 22%. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 824. 
105. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 4 ASA BULL. 173, 179 (1986). 
106. This approach to selecting party-appointed arbitrators raises questions about their obligations of 
impartiality. Notably, Jan Paulsson finds these questions troubling enough to argue for 
elimination of the practice of so-called “unilateral appointments.” See Paulsson, supra note 83. For 
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3. The Benefits of Dissenting Opinions 
Dissenting opinions may facilitate structural refinement of decisional methodologies 
in investment arbitration. Scholars of judicial decision-making have identified the so-
called “doctrinal paradox,” which posits that complex cases involving two or more 
independent issues may be capable of different outcomes by the same decision-makers 
depending on whether the tribunal decides the case on an issue-based analysis (deciding 
independent issues on an issue-by-issue basis) or a conclusion-based analysis (deciding 
cases based on agreement about a final outcome). 107  Given the rapid evolution of 
international investment law, and the already-profound challenges to inconsistent and 
indeterminate outcomes, focus is on the doctrinal paradox, and its potential effects may 
hold specific benefits for the development of investment law.108  
Issue-based decision-making would arguably increase transparency and enhance the 
legitimacy of arbitral awards by tying outcomes more closely to actual consensus on 
particular issues, rather than consensus about final outcomes. Proponents argue that 
issue-based analysis, and more generally clarity about which methodology is being 
applied, may reduce the potential for political decision-making.109 Consideration of the 
effect of the doctrinal paradox, and the potential for introducing an issue-by-issue 
decisional methodology, is directly attributable to the emergence of dissenting 
opinions.110 
Another way dissenting opinions may contribute to the legitimacy of investment 
arbitration is in promoting party acceptance of awards. For example, in Wena Hotels Ltd. 
v. Egypt, the arbitrator appointed by Egypt issued a two-sentence statement that he 
“concurs in the Tribunal’s entire award,” including the award of compound interest, but 
was “not persuaded that compounding should be quarterly.”111 The separate opinion on a 
narrow, and seemingly insignificant issue, arguably underscores the arbitrator’s 
 
an affirmative case in favor of party-appointed arbitrators and an analysis of their impartiality 
obligations, see CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014) 
(forthcoming). 
107. For a detailed explication of the doctrinal paradox, known to political scientists as “Ostrogorski’s 
paradox,” see Manuel Conthe, Majority Decision in Complex Arbitration Cases: The Role of Issue-
By-Issue Voting (2010), http://www.josemigueljudice-
arbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ARBITRAGEM/01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/awards/Majorit
y_decisions_and_issue-by-issue_voting.pdf. 
108. Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, The Doctrinal Paradox and International Law, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 67, 68 (2012).  See also id. at 128 (reasoning that, to the extent outcome-based decision-making 
“creates less intelligible precedent, these concerns have particular force given that the corpus of 
international law is still in its infancy”). 
109. Id. at 72-73, 82. 
110. See id. at 98. 
111. See Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Statement of 
Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Dec. 8, 2000), 6 ICSID Rep. 68, 128 (2004). 
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substantive agreement with the rest of the tribunal on the balance of the issues.112 In the 
absence of the separate opinion, the appointing party would not know that the arbitrator 
affirmatively agreed with the tribunal’s decision, and may well assume the award was 
effectively a 2-1 decision with acquiescence (not affirmative agreement) by its party-
appointed arbitrator. Knowing that the arbitrator it selected affirmatively agreed with 
the substance of an award may contribute to that party’s acceptance of the outcome as 
legitimate. 
In sum, van den Berg’s study of dissenting opinions raises important questions and 
has made a significant contribution to this debate. It also, however, demonstrates how 
starting policy preference can influence empirical analysis and how even striking 
empirical findings should not be a basis for proposed reforms without more holistic 
analysis of the substance and function of the phenomenon studied.  
B. Proposals for an International Investment Court 
Gus Van Harten has proposed the establishment of an international investment court 
to displace investment arbitration.113 Van Harten’s view, shared by others,114 is that 
private arbitrators are not suited or appropriate to resolve public law issues. 115 
Arbitrators’ lack of secure tenure and ensured compensation, he argues, undermine the 
administrative independence that protects independence and impartiality in national 
courts and public international law tribunals.116 Van Harten believes that a permanent 
investment arbitration court, in which judges share features with national court judges, 
could resolve perceptions of bias that derive from these features of investment 
arbitrators.117 This section challenges some of the assumptions underlying Van Harten’s 
 
112. Notably, because it is a relatively small sample, if this and the other cases Brower and Rosenberg 
argue are not treated as dissents and are subtracted from van den Berg’s sample, the overall rate 
of dissents would be less than twenty percent. Moreover, the percentage of dissents favoring an 
appointing party would be closer to eighty-five percent not one hundred percent. This latter 
number still represents a strong correlation between party-appointed arbitrators and dissents 
favoring the appointing party. As explained below, however, this correlation may well be the 
result of factors other than rank partisanship. 
113. VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 23, at 3.   
114. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the 
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit? 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 782 
(2008) (arguing that “interference with these [national] regulations by unelected and 
unappointed arbitrators is not consistent with basic principles of democracy”). 
115. Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL) 
Inaugural Conference 2008 Paper, No. 22/08 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424, at 16. 
116. Some of Van Harten’s and others’ arguments relate to the lack of reciprocity in the current 
investment arbitration regime (only investors can bring claims), and the absence of an appellate 
mechanism to ensure consistency. VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 
23, at 20. Those concerns, while not entirely unrelated to the arguments here, they are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
117. There are other objections that do not relate directly to international arbitrators, such as limited 
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proposal, particularly those tied to empirical research that he has more recently 
undertaken.  
One of the primary advantages of a permanent international investment court under 
Van Harten’s view is that it would eliminate ad hoc arbitrators in favor of permanent 
judges. Permanent appointment, it is presumed, structurally ensures independence 
because it avoids potential incentives that ad hoc arbitrators may have to skew their 
rulings in a way that will ensure future reappointment or more generally enlarge the 
body of arbitration cases.118 Although framed as a structural critique of investment 
arbitration, at least some aspects of Van Harten’s proposal appear to be implicitly 
intertwined with policy preferences and a presumption that those preferences may be 
more likely to prevail in a more traditional court structure.  
One such policy preference, for example, is Van Harten’s apparent preference for a 
restrictive scope of jurisdiction to review States’ actions regarding foreign investors. Van 
Harten hypothesizes that investment arbitrators are more likely to adopt an expansive 
approach to various contested issues of jurisdiction because of “apparent financial or 
career interests of arbitrators or by wider economic aims of the arbitration industry.”119 
The implied negative assumption appears to be that replacing arbitrators with 
permanent judges will reduce the tendency toward expansive interpretations of 
jurisdiction. 
Van Harten’s empirical research demonstrates a tendency of arbitrators to adopt what 
he has defined as an “expansive” approach to issues of jurisdiction. He concludes that his 
study offers “tentative support for expectations of systemic bias” in investment 
arbitration, but he also acknowledges its limitations.120 Despite his robust findings on 
this particular issue, Van Harten acknowledges that “they do not establish all of the 
steps of logic that would be required to connect the observed tendency to the underlying 
 
access by third parties, continued limits on transparency and the inability of States to bring 
claims. While important issues about system design, which are also related to Van Harten’s 
proposal, these system features are beyond the scope of this paper.  
118. Although Van Harten bolsters his arguments in recent works with empirical claims, his original 
calls for reform are based principally on perceptions of bias arising from the institutional structure 
of investment arbitration. See generally VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra 
note 23, at 175-84. Although Van Harten is careful not to make express empirical claims of bias, 
some of his arguments about perceptions of unfairness seem to be based on implicit empirical 
assumptions. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the 
Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627, 627 
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (“Investment treaty arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rules-
based system . . . . This claim is undermined, however, by procedural and institutional aspects of 
the system that suggest it will tend to favour claimants and, more specifically, those states and 
other actors that wield power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole.”) (emphasis 
added). It is nearly impossible to make characterizations about a legal system that do not 
implicate some empirical assumptions.   
119. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 213. 
120. See id. at 252. 
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rationales for the hypothesis.”121 There is, as Van Harten acknowledges, “a range of 
possible explanations for the results—some of which do not at all entail inappropriate 
bias.”122  
One potential alternative explanation for the expansive approach to jurisdiction 
observed in investment arbitration is that all adjudicators, both judges and arbitrators, 
have a proclivity toward expanding their own jurisdiction. That proclivity, in other 
words, may be tied not to arbitrators’ incentive to be appointed in future arbitrations, but 
to other more general explanations about the way adjudicators view their function. In 
fact, judges with permanent and fixed term appointments have, in various national legal 
systems, been observed as adopting positions and interpretations that expand their 
jurisdiction.123 The pattern may arguably be even more exaggerated among permanent 
international tribunals, where there is a prevailing “assumption[] that judges share an 
interest in expanding the reach of their court and that governments seek to present such 
occurrences.” 124  In an ironic historical twist, traditional judicial hostility toward 
commercial arbitration was the result of national courts guarding their jurisdiction 
against arbitrator-interlopers.125  At least with regard to policy preferences for more 
circumscribed jurisdiction, a permanent international court may not change the current 
situation. 
Another concern that inspires Van Harten’s proposal for a permanent court is that ad 
hoc appointment of arbitrators “create[s] apparent incentives for arbitrators to favour the 
 
121. Id. at 239. 
122. Id. at 215. 
123. Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest 
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 175, 209-14 (2010) (documenting 
strategies for expanding judicial jurisdiction in public interest litigation in India, the United 
States and Israel). “[C]ourts act strategically in expanding their roles in governance and 
policymaking through the gradual and incremental process of case-by-case dispute resolution, by 
occasionally accommodating the political interests or agenda of political elites, and while 
simultaneously broadening jurisdiction and its own remedial powers.”  Id. at 210. 
124. Voeten, supra note 94, at 671 (“[S]cholars have argued that the rulings” of various courts 
including the ECJ and the WTO Appellate Body have “amounted to judicial policymaking” and 
criminal tribunals have “helped to establish a substantial new body of international law.”); see also 
Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals 
Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at 
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004). 
125. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (discussing the jurisdictional “jealousy” of the courts and 
the resulting refusal to enforce arbitration agreements) (cited in Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme 
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92-93 n.5 
(2012)); see also John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for 
Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224 (1986) 
(analyzing courts’ centuries-long struggle by the early courts for jurisdiction and their consequent 
unwillingness to surrender it). In England, however, it may also have been related to English 
judges’ almost complete reliance on fees from cases for their income, which meant that arbitrators 
were unwelcome competitors.  See id. 
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class of parties (here, investors) that is able to invoke the use of the system.”126 His 
argument for a permanent court, echoed by others, appears to be informed by an 
assumption that members might be more likely to demonstrate deference to States and 
their legitimate State interests. 127  This hypothesis is, in turn, based on certain 
assumptions about both the nature of international courts and the composition of the 
judiciary of a potential permanent investment court.  
Van Harten and others who advocate for a permanent investment court seem to 
assume that judges would be drawn from something other than the pool of existing 
investment arbitrators, or from among a group of professionals with markedly different 
professional profiles.128 A sudden willingness by States to put forward an entirely new 
slate of investment judges who can replace investment arbitrators, and have a more 
State-sensitive outlook, may be overly optimistic.129   
At a more fundamental level, Van Harten’s and other critics’ calls for creation of a 
permanent international investment court are premised on a general gestalt that such 
courts would better serve the interests of States than ad hoc tribunals. Numerous 
commentators who have been examining the recent proliferation in international 
tribunals echo this confidence in permanent international courts.130  The assumption 
about the efficacy and desirability of permanent international courts, however, is subject 
to debate and not entirely consistent with experience.  
Instead, States have a long history of preferring international tribunals in which they 
 
126. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 219. 
127. Id. 
128. For example, the vigorous critique of investment arbitration put out by the Corporate Europe 
Observatory, entitled, Profiting from Injustice, critiques investment arbitrators as not having 
public and government credentials that are necessary to understand States’ positions in 
adjudicating investment disputes. Of the top 15 arbitrators they identify, however, most do seem 
to have public international law experience. Stern is a professor of public international law; 
Schwebel and Brower are former international court judges; and Schwebel, Brower, Vicuna, 
Lalond, Fortier, and Price all have extensive government service experience. It seems difficult to 
imagine that these repeatedly appointed arbitrators are so different in temperament or profile 
than judges who may be appointed to a permanent investment court.  
129. For example, many public law scholars express similar frustration that WTO judges fail to 
account for social concerns, including human rights. This propensity is arguably tied to the fact 
that judges were selected based on their knowledge of trade law. 
130. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 458 (2000) (“We define low 
independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of interstate dispute resolution and 
high independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of transnational dispute 
resolution.”); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 300-36 (1997) (establishing a multifactor 
checklist of what qualities are important in an international judicial body); Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005) (describing the benefits that States derive from 
“independent” tribunals).  
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can control, to some extent, the composition of the decision-maker panel.131 For example, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is a permanent court, allows States to 
determine the identity of the adjudicators (through the ad hoc procedures) and the 
overall composition of a panel that would hear an individual case. 132  According to 
Stephen Schwebel, a former President of the ICJ and frequent arbitrator in investment 
arbitration cases, the reasoning behind the ICJ’s statutory allowance of these “ad hoc 
chambers” is “to permit the parties to the case to influence both the size and the 
composition of the Chamber.”133 These mechanisms “provide States the comfort they seek 
. . . that an international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate.”134 These 
control mechanisms are regarded as essential features to keep State parties continuing to 
use the ICJ for their disputes.135 
States’ interest in controlling the composition of decisional panels has, together with 
other factors, led to what Gary Born refers to as a “second generation” of international 
adjudication.136 This new generation of tribunals has eclipsed in both numbers and effect 
traditional so-called “independent” permanent international courts.137 One reason for the 
rise of second generation tribunals, including for some State-to-State disputes that could 
otherwise go to the International Court of Justice, is that they allow States a degree of 
control over the adjudicatory decision-maker that eludes them with traditional, 
independent, permanent tribunals. Most notably, it permits them to control the 
composition of the tribunal.138  
While there is undoubtedly a mixed track record among States, those States with 
sophisticated in-house legal departments or outside legal counsel can be as exacting as 
investors in effectively managing the arbitrator selection process. 139  In one telling 
example, back in the 1980s, when international telephone rates were high, efforts by U.S. 
 
131. Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 
419 (2008) (arguing that mechanisms of control “provide States the comfort they seek . . . that an 
international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate,” and suggesting that when 
control mechanisms become perceived as inadequate, States will abandon their consent to the 
jurisdiction of international institutions).  
132. Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 
831, 834 (1987).  
133. Id.  
134. Cogan, supra note 131, at 419.  
135. Id. 
136. Gary B. Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 775-76 (2012). 
137. See id. at 819. 
138. Jason Yackee has argued that party-appointed arbitrators are an imperfect control mechanism, 
though in arguing for other thoughtful and important potential reforms outside the arbitration 
process, he seems to discount the value of this control, in part by overstating ethical restrictions on 
States’ ability to select arbitrators. Yackee, supra note 18, at 424 (arguing that “increasingly 
constrained by institutional rules and system norms that impose upon IIL arbitrators stringent 
standards of impartiality and independence”). 
139. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 255 (2007). 
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counsel at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to identify and investigate potential judges 
earned them a call from Washington for racking up exorbitant phone bills! 140  The 
contrasting example is that, despite recurring pleas from ICSID, less than half of the 
parties to the ICSID Convention (and disproportionately few from among developing 
economies) avail themselves of the right to make nominations to the List of 
Arbitrators.141 One of the primary problems with representation of State interests among 
arbitrators, therefore, may be the inability of (or lack of interest among) developing 
States in effectively controlling the composition of investment arbitration panels. This is 
a serious problem with the investment arbitration regime, but not necessarily one that 
would be resolved by the creation of a permanent court. 
C. Conclusion 
While providing an important contribution, some of van den Berg’s analysis may be 
traceable to pre-existing viewpoints that were not effectively separated from 
methodological choices made in constructing the survey. For example, assumptions about 
the appropriate baseline for comparing rates of dissenting opinions and the coding of 
decisions about whether certain dissents favor an appointing party seem to be predicated 
on assumptions tied to van den Berg’s perceptions about the limited utility of dissents.  
Van Harten’s research is rigorously adherent to objective empirical methodologies, 
despite his vociferous and oft-articulated critiques of investment arbitration in other 
scholarship. Van Harten is also careful to disclaim having found proof of bias. 142 
Nevertheless, alternative hypotheses might explain some of the statistical correlations 
identified by Van Harten. While the possibility of alternative theories does not 
undermine the quality of Van Harten’s research, it does suggest that even credible 
empirical results need to be tested and evaluated in light of other forms of research.   
In final conclusion, while this analysis has focused on some aspects of Van Harten’s 
empirical work that are critical of investment arbitration, the cautionary note expressed 
here is neither unique to his work specifically nor unique to empirical works whose 
findings support critiques of investment arbitration generally.   
 
 
140. George H. Aldrich, The Selection of Arbitrators, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE 
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS TRIBUNALS 65, 67 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 
2000). 
141. At present, 108 out of the 158 Member States have made some form of arbitrator nomination. See 




142. See Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 5. 
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III. The Role of Future Empirical Research in Investment 
Arbitration  
Empirical research has the potential to make meaningful contributions to existing 
debates about investment arbitration.143 Particularly with respect to a regime whose 
caseload is exploding, whose doctrine is expanding at a breakneck pace, but whose 
primary objectives and fundamental functions are still hotly contested, empirical 
research can have an important role. It can test the assumptions that animate the most 
serious critiques and ardent defenses of investment arbitration. In other areas of 
international law, empirical research has also proven to be a useful tool for refining 
“institutional design and practice to enhance international legal institutions’ 
effectiveness.”144 The potential contributions regarding arbitrators, however, should not 
be overstated. Empirical research can neither identify the extent to which extra-legal 
factors affect arbitral decision-making, nor disprove definitively the effect of those 
factors. It cannot, in other words, prove or disprove systemic bias in arbitral decision-
making.145  
Part I identified some the most significant methodological challenges faced in doing 
empirical research about investment arbitrators. These limitations mean that 
researchers would be well advised to be “less expansive . . . in drawing conclusions from 
their findings” and more careful in tying specific proposed reforms to empirical 
findings.146 Moreover, the limited explanatory power of quantitative models has in other 
areas prompted even committed empiricists to refocus on qualitative forms of legal 
scholarship, meaning both theoretical and doctrinal analysis of legal issues.147  In a 
similar vein, this Part proposes that future research about the efficacy and system design 
of investment arbitration expand beyond inquiries into alleged arbitrator bias, integrate 
other forms of scholarship to cross-test some of the hypotheses that inspire such 
empirical research, and engage in trans-institutional analysis of international tribunals.  
A. Broadening the Scope of Inquiry  
Investment arbitrators have been a primary focus of empirical research into 
investment arbitration for many understandable and legitimate reasons.148 Arbitrators 
 
143. Franck, supra note 9, at 4-5 (“Empirical legal scholarship can and should aid the examination 
of the current system to test conventional wisdom, dispel myths, and provide data that can 
promote efficient conflict management.”). 
144. Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 9. 
145. This is a point Van Harten makes repeatedly. For this reason, he predicates his calls for reform 
not on findings of alleged bias, but rather the perception of bias. Van Harten, A Case for an 
International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 1-3.   
146. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1907 (quoting Sisk, supra note 3, at 886 n.72). 
147. See generally Sisk, supra note 3, at 891. 
148. Other research into investment law more generally addresses questions about whether or to what 
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are the most obvious determinants of outcomes, and their professional milieu makes an 
intriguing target for study. Given this focus, it is perhaps not surprising that when 
empirical research identifies correlations between particular features of disputes and 
particular outcomes, the tendency is to attribute observed correlations to systemic bias of 
arbitrators. While arbitrator bias may be the most obvious hypothesis, it is by no means 
the only one. Myriad factors other than the arbitrators themselves can and inevitably do 
affect case outcomes and therefore should be the object of more systematic and sustained 
empirical study.  
Take for example, again, Van Harten’s findings that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between jurisdictional findings in favor of claimants generally, and even more 
interestingly, in favor of several capital-exporting countries, particularly the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Van Harten hypothesizes that arbitrators would be 
“more responsive to the interests of [these claimants].”149 Although he begins with a 
working hypothesis of arbitrator bias, upon finding a correlation, Van Harten also notes 
that several alternative hypotheses may explain the correlation, including: 
factual or contextual variations that encourage arbitrators to bend the law in order 
to assume or decline jurisdiction depending on claimant nationality; ideological 
preferences that cause arbitrators to be more dubious of the legal arguments of 
non-Western or capital-importing states and their nationals; variations in the 
quality of legal representation or the wisdom of appointment decisions among 
different claimant nationalities; variations in the degree to which specific cases 
influence interpretations adopted in subsequent cases; disproportionate influence 
by a small cohort of frequently appointed arbitrators who are represented on many 
tribunals; structural factors such as the role of appointing authorities in choosing 
arbitrators; or a complex and varying mix of these and other possible 
explanations.150  
In the final phrase of this list, Van Harten leaves open the possibility of still other 
possible explanations.  
One possible alternative explanation might be that more exacting fact-finding 
techniques may be more likely to be pressed by parties or counsel from common law 
jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and the UK.151 Such techniques may also be used more 
 
extent BITs actually increase levels of foreign investment, and why States enter into BITs. See 
Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some 
Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (summarizing research into effect of 
BITs); Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bargaining Over Dispute Settlement Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010). 
149. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 224 (“These hypotheses [about jurisdictional interpretations 
favorable to capital-exporting States] were based on expectations that arbitrators would be 
more responsive to the interests of major Western capital-exporting states than those of other 
states due to the relative influence of the former.”). 
150. Id. at 249-250.  
151. Conversely, fact-finding techniques may be less of a focus for German parties or less likely to 
be pressed by civil law trained counsel, which may be a more likely choice for investors from 
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often and more systematically by private firms, which are attuned to such techniques 
from commercial arbitration and operating with more extensive budgets, than by States’ 
attorney generals. 152  More exacting fact-finding may help establish stronger factual 
predicates for jurisdictional findings, and might be an alternative explanation for the 
correlation observed.153  
The role of counsel and strength of parties’ cases to date have not been important 
focuses of empirical research. These omissions are particularly striking given some very 
compelling anecdotal evidence about deficiencies in legal representation among smaller 
and developing States.154 With the rise of third-party funding, the effect of counsel and 
litigation resources is bound to become an even more important variable that warrants 
more careful investigation. 155  If counsel and legal resources were identified as 
contributing to disparate outcomes in cases, that finding would suggest very different 
prescriptions for reform than if the disparate outcomes were attributable solely to 
arbitrator bias. For this reason, they are important areas for future empirical study. 
Relatedly, substantive differences in relevant BITs or other applicable law have not 
been independently tested or effectively factored into studies testing for arbitrator 
bias.156 Moreover, even if there is no formal system of stare decisis, awards in earlier 
cases are often relied on as persuasive authority when similar issues arise in later cases. 
For this reason, timing and the existence of earlier cases on point may explain some 
trends in outcomes that are otherwise attributed to arbitrators. Particularly given the 
 
Germany or France. See, e.g., Richard H. Kreindler, Amy C. Kläsener & Christina Cathey 
Schuetz, International Arbitration, in BUSINESS LAWS OF GERMANY § 17:37 (2012) (describing 
a more cautious and restrained approach by German attorneys and arbitrators regarding 
evidentiary matters in international arbitration).  
152. John R. Crook, Fact-Finding in the Fog: Determining the Facts of Upheaval and Wars in Inter-
State Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 313, 315-20 (Catherine A. Rogers & 
Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (discussing with approval fact-finding techniques in investor-State 
arbitration in comparison to other public international tribunals). 
153. See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Equal Contest of Arms: Jurisdictional Proof in Investor-State 
Arbitrations, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 875, 895-97 (2013) (analyzing the importance of 
methods and standards for proving jurisdictional facts).  
154. Gottwald, supra note 139, at 255 (documenting based on interview research severe resource and 
experience deficits faced by counsel for Argentina and Seychelles). 
155. Notably, ICCA and Queen Mary are jointly launching a Task Force to study and make 
recommendations about the rise of third-party funding in international arbitration. See 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Latest News (last visited Oct. 5, 2013), 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/news.html (Joint Taskforce on Third-Party Funding Launched, 
July 3, 2013).   
156. See Sourgens, supra note 153, at 879 (“As current scholarship demonstrates, the interpretation of 
consent instruments can and does lead to facially inconsistent results. This inconsistency is not a 
result of incompetent arbitrators, nor an inherent and insurmountable arbitrariness of investment 
law. Rather, it results from the open-ended, “indeterminate” nature of advanced consents to 
arbitration by participating states.”) (footnotes omitted). In his study, for example, Van Harten 
distinguishes among different types of treaties, but does not consider the differing texts of such 
treaties. See Van Harten, supra note 43. 
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small sample of investment arbitration cases, the existence of a few high-profile cases on 
particular issues may have a significant impact on outcomes in subsequent cases.157 To 
date, the role of precedent and legal doctrine has not been meaningfully accounted for in 
empirical research in investment arbitration. Finally, as analyzed in Part I, there are 
significant methodological challenges to assessing empirically these qualitative variables. 
Critics may still maintain that broad jurisdictional rulings are undesirable. Cross-
testing of empirical findings regarding arbitrator bias with other possible explanations 
will confirm whether the primary source of their complaint is more likely arbitrator bias, 
or may instead be tied to provisions in particular BITs or national law,158 or other 
features of the system. Refinements in research considering these other variables could 
lead to more relevant reform proposals and avoid those proposals that would not 
necessarily resolve the underlying concerns.159  
B. Toward a Theory of International Adjudication 
The rise of international courts and tribunals is routinely acknowledged as one of the 
single most important recent developments in international law.160 International courts 
and tribunals are described as “the lynchpin of a new, rule-based international order, 
which increasingly displaces or purports to displace the previous power-based 
international order.”161 As a consequence, international adjudication has produced an 
enormous body of scholarship—doctrinal, normative, and empirical.162 The robust body of 
 
157. The heavy criticism that inconsistent awards have drawn may provide added incentives for 
arbitrators to give weight to prior awards rather than engaging in a completely independent 
analysis or reaching a different conclusion.  
158. As noted in Part I, similar critiques have been raised regarding empirical research into judicial 
decision making. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1926-27.  
159. For similar research on the effects of advocacy before the U.S. Supreme Court, see Richard J. 
Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by 
Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).  
160. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 709 (1999) (“When future international legal scholars look back 
at international law and organizations at the end of the twentieth century, they probably will 
refer to the enormous expansion and transformation of the international judiciary as the single 
most important development of the post-Cold War age.”); Bruno Simma, International 
Adjudication and U.S. Policy – Past, Present, and Future, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
39, 39 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds., 2001) (“International courts and tribunals are 
proliferating, and the caseload of some of these institutions appears to explode.”). 
161. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 226 (2012) (citing Karen Alter, Private Litigants and the New 
International Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22 (2006)); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Between 
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 
(2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). 
162. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International 
Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 
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empirical research on international courts and tribunals has helped sharpen debates over 
their nature, function, and effectiveness.  
Some empirical research into investment arbitration mimics the inquiries of these 
studies about other tribunals, most notably empirical studies about alleged bias among 
international judges.163 Few scholars if any, however, have attempted to compare or 
integrate empirical findings from other international tribunals—including findings 
related to alleged decisional bias—with similar findings regarding investment 
arbitration.  
To the contrary, there appears to be a sharp and even ironic divergence in the nature 
of inquiries about investment arbitration in comparison to other international tribunals. 
In the debate over system design in international tribunals, analysis in other areas of 
public international law, human rights, and international criminal law, appears focused 
on ensuring strong adjudicatory mechanisms that subject State decision-making and 
actions to international courts’ jurisdiction and judgments. Empirical research, as a 
consequence, focuses on the strength and effectiveness of tribunals in enforcing 
international law limits on State activities.164 When the category of international law 
being enforced is the rights of foreign investors, however, many commentators seem 
intent instead on prioritizing States’ ability to have their policy decisions and activities 
unhampered by international investment law.165  
To be sure, human rights violations, which often implicate jus cogens norms, and 
violations of the rights of foreign investors are not moral equivalents. No plausible 
 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2009) (“The growing number of international courts and their increasing 
activity have attracted the interest of scholars of international law, international relations, and 
comparative politics, leading to the launch of new empirical projects, a university press series, and 
a specialized journal.”); Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25 (surveying empirical research in 
international law and tribunals, including investment law and investment arbitration). 
163. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
164. See, e.g., Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: 
From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383 (2009); 
Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 162; Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Mike 
Burstein, The Will to Enforce: An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court 
of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 423 (2006); Leah Granger, Explaining the Broad-Based 
Support for WTO Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 521 (2006); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do 
International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 777 (2006); William Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International 
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).  
165. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary 
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 326-27 (2007) (identifying as a weakness in investment 
arbitration tribunals the inability under ICSID rules of States to appoint their own nationals to 
ensure that arbitrators have sufficient understanding and sympathy for the context of States’ 
decision-making). 
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explanation has been offered, however, about why a differential in the relative moral 
value of those categories of rights justifies radically different objectives in system design 
for the international tribunals. The more general claim of both public international law 
and international investment law is that they impose international law limits on States’ 
decision-making and actions. International tribunals impose both categories of 
international law limitations.   
The apparent shift in scholarly enthusiasm about the efficacy and function of 
international tribunals when investment law instead of human rights law is being 
enforced seems to suggest that policy preferences are affecting system design 
prescriptions in the different contexts. If the real objection to investment arbitration 
outcomes is a substantive one (i.e., that the line protecting investor rights should be 
drawn in a different place), then optimal reform proposals may not involve systemic 
reforms to investment arbitration, but instead changes to substantive investment law.166 
Moreover, a comprehensive theory of international adjudication, particularly one 
premised on the notion that adjudication must be a neutral and law-bound process, 
cannot develop if such policy preferences distort system design in international tribunals. 
Comparative analysis between investment arbitration and other international 
tribunals could help cut through some of these apparent inconsistencies. Such 
comparative analysis could lead the way to a more comprehensive theory of international 
adjudication and help strengthen assessments of some features of investment 
arbitration. For example, one critique of investment arbitration is that it allows only for 
claims by investors, but not by States. At first blush, inequality between parties seems 
contrary to the nature of adjudication.167 Comparative analysis reveals, however, that 
other adjudicatory regimes contemplate disputes in which one category of parties will 
necessarily always be in a defensive posture and another category will have an exclusive 
opportunity to assert affirmative claims. This unilateralism is true, for example, with 
human rights claims before the ECHR, which can only be against States,168 and claims in 
U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute, which are exclusively brought by “alien” 
 
166. One obvious link between substance and system design is that the vague and indeterminate 
nature of BIT and treaty provisions effectively delegates to arbitral tribunals substantial 
interpretive power. While other areas of international law are arguably similarly indeterminate, a 
reasonable argument can be made for greater delineation by States of the extent and limits of 
investor rights. While greater definition would have the effect of reducing interpretive delegation 
to investment arbitrators, it is a reform in the substance of investment law, not the system design 
of investment arbitration.  
167. V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers 1980) (describing the history of audi alteram partem, or equality of the parties, in the 
context of adjudication). 
168. The ECHR’s jurisdiction extends to allegations brought against Member States for alleged 
breaches of the Convention, but may be brought by either individuals or other member states. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 32, 
33 & 34, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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individuals against either State actors or corporations.169 
The asymmetry of legal proceedings reflects the fact that both substantive investment 
law and human rights law address “the asymmetric legal relationship between sovereign 
States and private actors operating within their boundaries.”170 In this sense, [b]oth 
international human rights law and international investment law seek to compensate for 
the inferior legal position of individuals and investors under the domestic law of the 
State in which they operate by enhancing legal protection at the international level.”171 
Private enforcement of these rights is a natural consequence of the rise of the individual 
in international law that is reflected in these procedural structures. Comparative 
institutional analysis reveals that procedural asymmetry is neither unique nor 
necessarily, in and of itself, a design defect that indicts the entire investment arbitration 
regime. 
Comparative analysis may also help either refine or dilute other criticisms of 
investment arbitration. For example, critics such as Van Harten often make generalized 
critiques that investment disputes are resolved by “arbitrators” not “judges.” 172 
Comparative analysis may challenge this explanation because, in the international 
arena, the distinction between these two categories is not always clear or important. For 
example, although often referred to as “judges,” those serving on the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal are technically “arbitrators.”173 On various international tribunals, such 
as the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, State parties are 
permitted to appoint “ad hoc judges” to panels hearing their cases.174 The nature and 
function of such ad hoc judges is not so different from ad hoc arbitrators. Finally, 
arbitrators have presided in numerous important State-to-State disputes that might 
otherwise have been submitted to classic public international law courts.175  
Many proposed reforms for investment arbitration cited in the introduction are 
predicated on skepticism about investment arbitrators and other design features that 
 
169. Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). 
170. Paula F. Henin, The Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty Tribunals Over Investors' Human Rights 
Claims: The Case Against Roussalis v. Romania, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 224, 226 (2012). 
171. See id. 
172. Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 21-32. 
173. Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 515 n.67 
(2006) (citing news reports that refer to members of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals as both 
“arbitrators” and “judges”).  
174. See Schwebel, supra note 132. 
175. Examples include arbitrations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission, and arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS”) between Guyana and Suriname and between Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Gary Born, State-to-State Arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (July 20, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/07/20/state-to-state-
arbitration-at-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/. 
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critics treat as unique to the investment arbitration regime. Comparative analysis with 
other international tribunals can help reveal the true strengths or shortcomings of these 
critiques. Comparative institutional analysis would also force scholars to locate their 
assessment of investment arbitration in a more comprehensive theory of international 
adjudication. 
To date the only real effort to engage in systematic comparative analysis of the system 
design of international tribunals that includes investment tribunals has been Gary 
Born’s work identifying a “New Generation” of international tribunals.176 Born argues 
that these “Second Generation” tribunals, which include investment arbitration 
tribunals, are more frequently used by States, and more likely to render enforceable 
outcomes. As a result, he argues, this new generation of tribunals has “important 
implications for analysis of international adjudication.”177 They signal that international 
adjudication cannot be dismissed (as some critics have posited) as ineffectual, “marginal 
and unimportant in contemporary international affairs.”178  
The success and effectiveness of this second generation of tribunals, Born claims, has 
important implications for system design of future international tribunals.179 The success 
of investment arbitration, he argues, challenges what had been settled assumptions 
about what makes international tribunals effective. To the extent supportable, this line 
of argument suggests that perhaps instead of reforming investment arbitration to look 
more like public international tribunals, public international law tribunals have 
something to learn from investment arbitration.   
C. Integrating Empirical Research with Other Methodologies 
One final observation, tied to the prescriptions in Sections III.A. and III.B., is that 
empirical research into investment arbitration should be complemented by and tied into 
other forms of research.180 In an articulate statement of the obvious, Beth Simmons 
explains, “when we are evaluating our world and the legal institutions that create it, 
empirical studies are undeniably important, but they can never tell the whole story.”181  
Despite the fact that they cannot tell the whole story, for the reasons described in Part I, 
empirical research has the potential to have a profound impact on investment arbitration, 
including bolstering or undermining support for proposed reforms. Empirical research 
pertaining to national judiciaries or even other international tribunals does not carry with it 
the same potential for affecting significant structural reforms. The potential effect of empirical 
 
176. See Born, supra note 136, at 775-76. 
177. Id. at 877. 
178. Id.  
179. Id. at 878. 
180. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25. 
181. Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 219. 
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research regarding investment arbitration increases the importance of supplementing such 
research with qualitative assessment of institutional features that affect decision-making in 
investment arbitration so that any reforms adopted are based on the whole story. 
IV. Conclusion 
Critics of international investment arbitration focus on the role of investment 
arbitrators for good reason. Investment treaties establish skeletal frameworks for the 
substance of international investment law and for investment arbitration procedures. 
But international arbitrators are the ones putting meat on those bones. That is an 
awesome responsibility and exercise of power. That power, in turn, is exercised in a high-
stakes environment where every issue exists in a tangle of policy disagreement – cases 
like Chevron v. Ecuador and Phillip Morris v. Uruguay illustrate that graphically.182 In 
this politically charged environment, the power that investment arbitrators exercise 
could never be perceived as “a-political.” When critics accuse investment arbitrators of 
being political, however, that is not what they mean.  
 Instead, they are expressing skepticism about whether investment arbitrators can and 
do provide neutral, law-bound decisions on investment law disputes. According to some 
critics, they do not, but instead make political decisions based on their own policy 
preferences or personal interests. The means of appointing investment arbitrators—on an ad 
hoc basis and through procedures that involve intentional selection by parties—provides the 
intuition for these assumptions. Despite this intuition, however, individualized selection has 
some features to commend it in international settings.  Most notably, it is a control function 
that States have exercised in various other international adjudicatory contexts.  
In the debate over the legitimacy of investment arbitration, both sides of the debate 
have invoked empirical research in support of their assessment of its procedures and its 
outcomes. Empirical research has an important role to play in training focus on 
particular questions and providing support for and against particular claims about the 
system. As Van Harten acknowledges, however, “there is not, and probably never will be, 
conclusive empirical evidence of the presence or absence of systemic bias in investment 
arbitration.”183 While this conclusion should not undermine the importance of empirical 
research into such possible bias, it should caution against overstating the implications of 
any particular study and encourage examining empirical findings in light of research 
about other tribunals and other features of international adjudication.   
 
182. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/257; Philip Morris Brand Sarl 
(Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental 
Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet; http://www.italaw.com/cases/460. 
183. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 215. 
